THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS

Theory and Research

Edited by
JESSICA L. TRACY
RICHARD W. ROBINS
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Foreword by Joseph J. Campos



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The Development of Self-Conscious Emotions

Cognitive Processes and Social Influences

KRISTIN HANSEN LAGATTUTA ROSS A. THOMPSON

he development of children's ability to experience, recognize, and understand the selfconscious emotions of pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment is of rising scientific interest (Bosacki, 2000; Heerey, Keltner, & Capps, 2003; Kornilaki & Chlouverakis, 2004; Lewis, Chapter 8, this volume; Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, & Deij, 2004; Tracy, Robins, & Lagattuta, 2005). Investigation into the origins of self-conscious emotions is intriguing because it bridges core areas of developmental research: the development of self-awareness, self-evaluation, and social comparison, as well as the growth of a theory of mind-how children come to understand themselves and other people in relation to intentions, desires, beliefs, thoughts, and emotions (see Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). Moreover, because self-conscious emotions arise from how we evaluate our skills and behaviors in relation to normative standards or to how we imagine other people will appraise us, selfconscious emotions are also inherently about relationships-about connections between self and other (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & Ridgeway, 1986; Harris, 1989; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Indeed, self-conscious emotions play a formative role in the development of self-regulation, compliance, and conscience; in the maintenance of relationships; and in current and long-term achievement motivation, self-esteem, and mental health (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Lewis, 1993; Stipek, 1995).

This chapter examines cognitive and social processes underlying the development of self-conscious emotions. We focus on how early concepts about self, mind, and others result in feelings of pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment in infancy and early childhood.

We also review developmental changes in how children come to understand the causes and consequences of these different emotions. Because self-conscious emotions involve relationships between self and other, we also explore how individual differences in the expression, recognition, and understanding of self-conscious emotions arise from the quality and type of interactions children have with significant others in their everyday lives.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN INFANCY AND TODDLERHOOD

One of the foremost questions in research on the development of self-conscious emotions is at what age humans are first capable of experiencing feelings of pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment. Converging evidence from developmental studies identifies three core conceptual foundations for a person's ability to experience self-conscious emotions (Lewis, 1995, 2001; Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004a). First, because self-conscious emotions are inherently selfdirected, a rudimentary sense of self-awareness must develop before these emotions can occur. Second, the person must be able to recognize an external standard against which his or her behavior or characteristics can be evaluated. That standard may be a rule, expectation, or goal that has been satisfied or not, or it may be another's evaluation or judgment. Third, the person must adopt that standard and be able to evaluate the degree to which he or she meets, exceeds, or fails to match the standard. For example, one does not feel pride unless the accomplished goal is personally meaningful or another's applause is important for self-evaluation. Although these foundations for the emergence of selfconscious emotions are developmentally complex, there is evidence that young children reach these cognitive achievements and begin to experience pride, guilt, shame, and embarrassment at the end of the second year or the beginning of the third year of life. As these conceptual foundations continue to develop throughout childhood, so also does children's experience of and understanding of self-conscious emotions.

Capacity for Self-Awareness

Early capacity for self-awareness is often studied by examining how infants respond to their mirror appearance after a spot of rouge has been surreptitiously applied to their noses. Before 15 to 18 months, infants do not touch their noses in response to their mirror images, but between 18 and 24 months there is a significant increase in mark-directed touching, sometimes accompanied by signs of embarrassment (e.g., smiling and looking down and away from the reflection; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This ability to pass the "rouge test" is considered to reflect the emergence of physical self-recognition, and it has been regarded by some as marking the emergence of the "conceptual self" (Howe & Courage, 1997).

Some researchers have questioned whether the rouge test should be considered the "gold standard" for demonstrating the presence or absence of a sense of self. That is, infants may achieve rudimentary forms of self-awareness many months prior to being able to pass the rouge test. For example, 2-month-olds often exhibit "coy" or "shy" behaviors when interacting with an overly stimulating adult or when viewing themselves in the mirror (Reddy, 2001). Moreover, 2- and 3-month-olds can detect contingencies between their

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Other researchers argue that the rouge test assesses only a limited form of self-awareness—that is, physical self-recognition—but that other concurrent advances better reflect the emergence of conceptual self-awareness at the end of the second year. These include verbal self-referential behavior (e.g., "Me big!"), verbal labeling of internal experiences such as emotions (including comparisons between emotions of self and others), assertions of competence and responsibility as autonomous beings (such as refusing assistance), assertions of ownership ("Mine!"), categorizing the self by gender and in other ways, and young children's growing interest in how their behavior is regarded by others (see Thompson, 2006, for a review). Taken together, this constellation of behaviors by the end of the second year suggests that toddlers are developing a basic awareness of the self that goes beyond simple mirror recognition of outward bodily appearance, and provides a foundation for self-conscious emotions.

Recognition of External Standards

Consider next infants' emerging recognition of external standards for behavior and performance. Between the first and second year, infants become increasingly interested in what other people are looking at, evaluating, and emotionally reacting toward. Indeed, starting around their first birthday, infants become strongly motivated to establish joint attention, they increasingly point and gesture to attract attention to objects and people in their environment, and they engage in social referencing (i.e., looking to adult emotional cues to clarify their own interpretation of an object, person, or event). For example, Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, and Tidball (2001) found that when 12-month-olds were shown ambiguous objects, they spontaneously looked to the experimenter's emotional reaction and used that as a guide to their own behavior. They avoided objects that experimenters reacted negatively toward and approached objects that adults emoted positively toward (see also Harter, 1998; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). This is one way that infants begin to understand others' evaluations and judgments about events of shared interest.

Through their social referencing, efforts to establish joint attention, and gesturing and pointing, infants reveal increasing cognizance that other people have mental lives: perceptions, intentions, evaluations, and emotions *about* things in the world. These early insights precede later, more developed, understandings about mind in the preschool years (see Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000), and likely provide a critical foundation for recognizing social standards. That is, referential behaviors not only enable infants to gather information about people and objects in the world, but they also allow them to learn social expectations for behavior and performance. For example, when a mother responds with a loud "Ahhh!" when the baby looks to the mother while reaching sticky fingers toward expensive electronic equipment, the adult imbues that behavior with an affective valence for the infant. The parent's response is even more influential

when his or her emotional cues are accompanied by imperative language and Likewise, when the parent responds enthusiastically to a toddler's drawing, the activity assumes a positive emotional tone for the child. In these ways, social referencing helps infants to establish the affective valuation of certain actions and to form connections between their own behavior and the emotional reactions of others. These experiences provide a foundation for the development of feelings of guilt, pride, and shame (Thompson, Meyer, & McGinley, 2006).

Accepting Others' Evaluations and Social Standards

The conclusion that pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment have developmental origins around the second birthday is further supported by evidence that the third foundation of self-conscious emotions—accepting others' standards for oneself—also begins to emerge at this time. Toward the end of the second year, toddlers become *personally sensitive* to normative standards and expectations for achievement and behavior. For example, Kagan (1981, 2005) reports that during this period (but not before) children become visibly concerned when standards of wholeness and intactness have been violated, such as when they notice missing buttons from garments, torn pages from books, trash on the floor, broken toys, or misplaced objects (see also Lamb, 1993). Kagan has interpreted this phenomenon as an emerging moral sense because these events violate the implicit norms or standards that are typically enforced by parents through sanctions on broken, marred, or damaged objects. Similarly, Kochanska, Casey, and Fukumoto (1995) argue that early responses to mishaps, damage, or incompleteness reflect an emerging system of internal standards about right and wrong.

By 2½ years of age, children exhibit concern about personal responsibility in achievement settings. They express greater pride and attention seeking after finishing a task by themselves (e.g., a shape-sorting cube) compared with watching the task completed by an experimenter (Stipek et al., 1992). In both cases, the goal was achieved, but only in the former did the "self" have control over its outcome. Relatedly, 2-year-olds are notorious for rejecting parental assistance and wanting to do things "by themselves" (Geppert & Küster, 1983). This desire for self-competence is so great that, according to Kagan (1981), toddlers of these ages show clear signs of anxiety or distress when an adult models a task that is too difficult for them to achieve by themselves, with this anxiety likely reflecting an internal evaluation that he or she has failed to meet a standard for performance.

Interim Summary

By the end of the second or the beginning of the third year young children achieve, at least on a very basic level, cognitive achievements essential for experiencing self-conscious emotions: self-awareness, attention to the standards against which one's behavior can be evaluated, and personal acceptance of these external standards for oneself. During the infant and toddler years, infants also become increasingly attuned to the psychological lives of other people—they actively reference others' evaluations and emotional reactions to guide their own behavior. Thus, young children not only become more aware of their own "self" but they also develop stronger interest in other people's emotions and evaluations. With these conceptual foundations in place, most 2-year-olds begin to display behavioral indicators of experiencing pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment.

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SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN THE PRESCHOOL YEARS

Between the ages of 3 and 5 children's language rapidly develops, leading to a more extensive vocabulary for talking about feelings, including self-conscious emotions, as well as more frequent parent-child conversations about current, past, and future emotional events (Lagattuta & Wellman, 2002; Saarni, 1999; Thompson, Laible, & Ontai, 2003). Numerous studies reveal that these parent-child conversations significantly shape children's understanding of the causes and consequences of emotions, their knowledge about rules and standards for behavior, and their developing representations of who they are as individuals (see Fivush & Nelson, 2006; Thompson et al., 2003; Thompson & Lagattuta, 2006).

The everyday contexts in which young children learn about these standards are important for how they are likely to be personally applied. That is, because many rules and expectations concern daily routines (e.g., at mealtime or bedtime), household procedures, play, and behavior at familiar locations (e.g., childcare, church), these standards become incorporated into young children's early prototypical knowledge systems and scripts and, as a result, begin to assume normative value (Nelson, 1978). In a sense, then, children's developing understanding of how things are done incorporates their grasp for how one should act in everyday situations. Therefore, one reason that young children not only comprehend behavioral expectations but also adopt them personally is that these standards have become integrated into their developing knowledge of the normative routines of everyday life. Indeed, young children's interest in normative standards of behavior and achievement develops at the same time that they are discerning normative standards in many other areas, such as personal appearance (recall their embarrassment at finding their rouge-marked noses in the mirror) and language (as they are mastering the meanings of words) (Thompson et al., 2006).

The rising frequency in conversations about emotions and standards coincides with advances in preschoolers' knowledge about self-conscious emotions and self-presentation. For example, Tracy et al. (2005) report that between the ages of 3 and 5 there is a significant increase in children's ability to recognize photographic depictions of pride. Indeed, preschoolers age 4 years and older recognized pride displays significantly above chance and at the same success rate as they identified depictions of happiness and surprise (see also Tracy & Robins, 2004b, for research with adults). Three- to 5-year-olds also know something about the valence of self-conscious emotions: they can readily categorize pride with positive emotions and shame, guilt, and embarrassment with negative emotions (see Bosacki & Moore, 2004; Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987; Russell & Paris, 1994). Moreover, 4-and 5-year-olds demonstrate knowledge about differences between real and apparent emotion (e.g., that a person can look one way but feel a different emotion inside; see Harris, 1989), and they show awareness of social situations that motivate people to engage in such deliberate, deceptive, self-presentational behaviors (Banerjee, 2002).

Self-Conscious Emotions and Theory of Mind

Arguably, young children's experience of and knowledge about self-conscious emotions are also greatly enhanced by their emerging awareness of their own mental states as well as the psychological perspectives of people around them (i.e., theory of mind). Indeed, self-conscious emotions stem from how a person *thinks* about or evaluates him- or herself in relation to standards of what kind of person he or she wants to or should be (e.g., nice,

smart, athletic) or in relation to how he or she imagines other people are thinking about or evaluating him or her. Thus developmental changes in children's understanding about the mind, including individual differences in this knowledge, should bear directly on how children come to experience, identify, and understand self-conscious emotions. During the preschool years, children acquire advanced conceptual understanding about desires, intentions, beliefs (including false beliefs), and thoughts (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000), as well as more sophisticated knowledge about connections between mental states and emotions (Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001; Lagattuta, Wellman, & Flavell, 1997). Moreover, they begin to view mental states as enduring, that is, they acknowledge that people have preferences, desires, beliefs, emotions, personality traits, and ways of acting and behaving that are consistent across time and situations (Heyman & Gelman, 1999).

Evidence for a connection between theory of mind development and self-conscious emotions comes from research by Cutting and Dunn (2002). They examined whether having an earlier, more precocious understanding of mind might lead to greater sensitivity to criticism. That is, the more one knows about what others might be thinking and believing, the more cognizant one might also be that one could be the subject of negative evaluation. This is exactly what they found. Three- and 4-year-olds who demonstrated advanced knowledge about the mind (as assessed through false belief tasks) were more likely as kindergarteners to lower their evaluation of a "student" puppet's performance after it received negative remarks by the "teacher" puppet compared to kindergarteners with low theory of mind knowledge in preschool. Similar findings were also reported by Dunn (1995): children's ability to pass a false belief task at 40 months predicted greater sensitivity to teacher criticism of their own work. Relatedly, individuals impaired in theory of mind understanding, notably children with autism, demonstrate more limited knowledge about self-conscious emotions (Heerey et al., 2003). Importantly, then, development in children's understanding of the mind may influence the emergence of a "looking glass self" (Cooley, 1902), or knowledge about the self that incorporates opinions of other people. This could result in increased vulnerability to feelings of shame, guilt, and embarrassment when standards are not met.

Self-Conscious Emotions and Self-Understanding

The development of young children's understanding of self-conscious emotions emerges in concert with advances in self-understanding. Indeed, one reason for their increased sensitivity to others' evaluations of them is that preschoolers are beginning to acquire more psychologically complex views of their personal characteristics. Researchers have shown that, contrary to the traditional view that young children perceive themselves only in terms of physical appearance and behavior (e.g., running fast, having brown hair), preschoolers view themselves also in terms of a range of internal capabilities, dispositions, and traits, including their social characteristics, academic abilities, and emotions (Goodvin, Meyer, Thompson, & Hayes, 2006; Marsh, Ellis, & Craven, 2002; Measelle, Ablow, Cowan, & Cowan, 1998). These self-views can take the form of a cognitive representation—akin to a naïve theory—about the self's individual desires, beliefs, preferences, emotions, and ways of acting (see Epstein, 1973). This developing self-concept also extends to concepts about morality in that children are beginning to perceive themselves in terms of a "moral self" who feels badly about wrongdoing, seeks to make amends, sympathizes with others' distress, and otherwise acts in a morally responsible fashion (Koch-

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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: TEMPERAMENT, PARENTING, AND CULTURE

Although most young children exhibit behaviors indicative of feeling self-conscious emotions—acting coy when they know others are looking at them, showing expanded posture and smiling when adults respond positively to their actions, looking sad or withdrawing after disobeying or receiving negative feedback, and engaging in reparative behaviors after causing harm to others—there are individual differences in the frequency of these early expressions of pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment and in the situations where they occur (Ferguson & Stegge, 1995; Kochanska, DeVet, Goldman, Murray, & Putnam, 1994; Stipek, 1995; Stipek et al., 1992; Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). Therefore, before proceeding further in our discussion of age-related developments in children's experience, expression, and understanding of self-conscious emotions, it is critical to consider sources of variability including temperament, parenting, and culture that may significantly shape the timing, progression, and frequency of self-conscious emotions during childhood.

Temperament

Variability in the frequency of self-conscious emotions can arise from individual differences in temperament. For example, Kochanska and her colleagues report that children who exhibit greater guilt in response to wrongdoing are more temperamentally fearful and reactive than those who show less guilt (Kochanska et al., 1994; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; see also Kagan, 2005). Thus, temperamental qualities may make young children more versus less susceptible to the feelings of shame and guilt from parental criticism or disapproval, another's upset, or their own internal awareness of having acted wrongly.

Early emerging individual differences in proneness to shame and guilt have also been found in young children's responses to "rigged mishap incidents," situations where children are led to believe that they have damaged the experimenter's special toy. Using this paradigm, Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, and Cole (1993) reliably distinguished 2-year-olds who exhibited guilt (whom they called the "amenders" because they tried to repair the toy and told the experimenter what they had done) from children who exhibited shame (whom they called the "avoiders" because they avoided the experimenter, were slow to repair the toy, and slow to confess to the experimenter). Kochanska et al. (2002) also examined young children's affective and behavioral responses to rigged mishaps. Not only were there individual differences in children's concern and distress reactions at 22 months, but these differences remained stable over time and were modestly predictive (especially at 45 months) of assessments of conscience and moral behavior at 56 months.

Parenting and Discipline

The parenting context in which young children learn about standards, norms, and expectations contributes to variability in children's early experiences of pride, shame, guilt, and

embarrassment. That is, in comprehending behavioral standards, young children are aided by adults who convey behavioral expectations in everyday experiences. For example, once infants become capable of self-produced locomotion (around 9–12 months of age), caregivers significantly increase their communication of behavioral expectations as they caution, prevent, restrict, and sanction their exploratory forays—often resulting in battles of will (Campos et al., 2000). Moreover, there are dramatic increases during the second year in parental expectations for child compliance with respect to rules about touching dangerous objects; respecting property rights; participation in family routines; expectations for self-care or self-control with respect to waiting, sharing, aggression, and eating; and prohibitions about making messes and breaking things (Dunn & Munn, 1987; Gralinski & Kopp, 1993).

Perhaps the most powerful way in which parents convey standards and evaluations is by how they choose to discipline their child when he or she misbehaves. An extensive research literature has shown that parental disciplinary practices that are coercive and power assertive elicit children's immediate compliance but also the child's frustration, and that long-term internalization of values—including guilt when children misbehave—is often lacking. By contrast, discipline practices that emphasize reasoning and provide justification for compliance are more likely to foster internalized values in young children and spontaneous guilt after wrongdoing (see Grusec & Goodnow, 1994, and Grusec &

Kuczynski, 1997, for reviews).

More broadly, parental discipline provides a cognitive structure that explicitly links the parent's response to the child's violation of the external standard ("You know better than to hit your sister!"), invokes salient attributions of responsibility ("Why did you hit her?"), identifies consequences for another ("Look, she's crying!"), and induces the relevant self-conscious emotion ("You should be ashamed of yourself!"). The same is true of situations evoking pride in young children, when the parent's response likewise emphasizes the child's responsibility for creating a desirable outcome and elicits the relevant self-conscious emotion. By inducing feelings of pride, shame, guilt, and other emotions, and providing a verbal response that makes these causal associations explicit, the parent promotes considerable moral and emotional socialization in these contexts (Kochanska & Thompson, 1997).

As children grow older and develop a better understanding of these causal connections, the parent's disciplinary intervention provides a means of inducing a sense of responsibility and relevant self-conscious emotions that motivate apologetic and reparative behavior (or, in the case of pride, enhanced self-esteem and task persistence). In each instance, however, the arousal of appropriate guilt or shame is facilitated by the parent's rational and reasoned response to misbehavior. By contrast, when the parent's intervention is more coercive and punitive, a child of any age is more likely to experience fear,

anxiety, or anger rather than guilt (Hoffman, 1970).

As we have reviewed, temperament is associated with children's proneness to guilt and shame. Not surprisingly, then, research has shown that the most constructive discipline practices for the development of guilt depend, in part, on the child's temperamental profile (Kochanska, 1993, 1995, 1997; Thompson et al., 2006). For example, children who are temperamentally fearful or anxious benefit most from noncoercive discipline practices that enlist the child's discomfort without creating overwhelming distress. For these children, the motivation to behave morally derives from efforts to avoid such aversive feelings. In contrast, for temperamentally fearless children, the emotional incentives for compliance arise not from harsh discipline, but rather from the relational incentives

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As children internalize parents' evaluative standards for themselves, they increasingly experience pride, guilt, or shame on their own, even in situations where they are unsupervised or parental judgments are not immediately apparent. These internalized evaluations influence children's self-perceptions and help to explain why, over time, children come to perceive their characteristics and competencies in ways that are similar to how parents and teachers evaluate them (Marsh et al., 2002; Measelle et al., 1998). In families where parents are harshly critical or denigrating, this process can contribute to excessive guilt and shame because children come to internalize parental judgments and evaluations that are unreasonably negative.

Parenting in Achievement Contexts

Discipline illustrates only one forum in which parental evaluations of the child's conduct contribute to individual differences in children's proneness to experiencing guilt and shame. As Stipek (1995) has noted, young children's anticipation of parental reactions is one reason for their emotional responses to success or failure. The expectant smile or the averted gaze of a young child in the parent's presence reflects the importance of the adult's response to his or her self-evaluation in achievement situations. Thus, parents who regularly applaud their child's accomplishments, and who respond with dismay, disapproval, or denigration when the child fails to meet expected standards, contribute to the emergence of feelings of pride, guilt, or shame in preschoolers. Kelly, Brownell, and Campbell (2000) found, for example, that mothers' negative evaluations of their toddler's behavior during a challenging task at 24 months predicted children's shame responses during subsequent achievement tasks at age 3.

Parents convey their expectations and evaluations of children's competencies in indirect ways as well. For example, Pomerantz (Pomerantz, 2001; Pomerantz & Eaton, 2001) found that with increasing age, children more often view their parents' efforts to monitor, guide, and provide uninvited help with homework as an indication that their parents have a low evaluation of their competence. This is particularly true for children of low ability, suggesting that these children may be most prone to experience shame in these situations. More recently, however, Bhanot and Jovanovic (2005) found that girls, even those high in ability, were more likely than boys to interpret unsolicited adult intervention with their math homework as an indication that the teacher or parent believed them to be incompetent. Thus, ability perceptions as well as child gender may influence how children interpret and emotionally respond to adult assistance. More generally, then, in the same manner that discipline approaches contribute to children's comprehension of the associations between personal responsibility for misbehavior and feelings of guilt or rule compliance and feelings of pride, parental (and teacher) behaviors also contribute to children's experience as well as understanding of the reasons for feeling pride and shame in achievement situations.

Parental reactions to child success or failure also shape children's developing theories about their own abilities. Indeed, there are individual differences in the kinds of self-directed thoughts preschoolers have during challenging tasks. For example, Heyman, Dweck, and Cain (1992) found that 4- and 5-year-olds who attribute failure to internal, stable causes ("I am stupid, I can't do this") develop a more helpless response to criticism

by others or to failure on a task compared to preschoolers who attribute failure to internal unstable causes ("I didn't try hard enough") or task difficulty ("That test was hard to do"). These response patterns, including the emotions that go with them (shame tends to be associated with stable and guilt with unstable attributions for failure; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006), have significant consequences for learning. Helpless children tend to give up in the face of failure or criticism whereas mastery-oriented children persist.

Parenting and Attachment

The broader quality of the parent-child relationship is also important to children's experience of guilt, pride, and shame. Attachment theory has provided a conceptually rich window through which to explore the influence of the parent-child relationship on selfconscious emotions. According to this approach, the security of the parent-child relationship is a foundation for early psychological development, with children's developing representations of themselves, close partners, and relationships shaped by their experience of the parent-child relationship (see Thompson, 2006, for a review). The security of attachment also makes children differentially sensitive to self-related information, with securely attached children more likely to be receptive to positive feedback concerning the self (consistent with the more positive self-concept generated by the secure attachment), and insecurely attached children more prone to remember and internalize negative information about the self. However, in the latter case, defensive processes might also impede insecure children's responsiveness to negative evaluations, making them paradoxically resistant to accepting criticism, for example, even as they have a more negative sense of their competencies and characteristics.

Research based on this formulation has yielded several conclusions. First, securely attached preschoolers generally regard themselves more positively than do insecurely attached children (Cassidy, 1988; Clark & Symons, 2000; Goodvin et al., 2006; Verschueren, Marcoen, & Schoefs, 1996). Colman and Thompson (2002) found, for example, that in problem-solving situations, insecurely attached preschoolers doubted their ability more, solicited help from their mothers earlier and in more unnecessary circumstances, and exhibited greater frustration than securely attached children on easy as well as difficult tasks. Second, in assessments of self-concept that directly evaluated children's capacity to acknowledge negative characteristics about the self, insecurely attached preschoolers are more resistant to admitting faults of any kind compared to securely attached children (Cassidy, 1988; Clark & Symons, 2000; but see Goodvin et al., 2006, for

contrary findings).

In more extreme circumstances, the negative quality of the parent-child relationship poses a hazard to healthy emotional development. This is especially true when home life is threatening, troubled, or disorganized and children are directly affected by parental affective psychopathology, domestic violence, or other problems. A large literature documents the risks to children's emotional health when they are living with a depressed parent, for example, and studies have underscored the heightened vulnerability to guilty feelings and a sense of responsibility that derives from the caregiver's helplessness, irritability, and blaming others for her or his sad affect (see Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990, for a thoughtful review). Similar processes of emotional enmeshment are apparent for children growing up in maritally conflicted homes (Cummings & Davies, 1994; Davies & Cummings, 1994; Davies & Forman, 2002). These studies of emotional development in

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tionship ome life parental re docused parilty feelitability, 90, for a children twies & ment in troubled families highlight the importance of studying the development of self-conscious emotions in settings that may be provocative of undue shame or guilt in children, particularly in families where children are at high risk for developing insecure attachments to caregivers.

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When parents talk and interact with their children during day-to-day events, they also convey cultural beliefs and expectations for behavior and achievement. These cultural values embedded in everyday conversations and routines can influence the development of children's understanding and experience of self-conscious emotions. In one study, for example, Chinese and American mothers were observed talking about their child's misbehavior in the child's presence. Whereas American mothers tended to attribute child misconduct to spunk or mischievousness, Chinese and Chinese American mothers more often emphasized the shame inherent in misbehavior (Miller, Fung, & Mintz, 1996; Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, & Mintz, 1990). Indeed, Chinese parents readily endorse shaming as a strategy to educate and socialize their children about the proper ways to behave (Fung, Lieber, & Leung, 2003). Children in Western and non-Western cultures also differ in their beliefs about whether anger or shame is the more appropriate emotional response to interpersonal difficulty, as well as in their understanding of the social conventions that govern the display of positive and negative emotions (Cole, Bruschi, & Tamang, 2002).

Cultural differences in whether the self is construed in an individualistic versus an interdependent fashion also influence the frequency and intensity of pride, shame, and guilt, including their precipitating causes and consequences (see Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995; Wong & Tsai, Chapter 12, this volume). For example, experiences of pride, shame, and guilt may result more frequently from the behaviors of *others* in collectivist cultures that have less distinct boundaries between self and other. Supporting data comes from Stipek (1988) who found that Chinese students were more likely than American students to feel guilt or shame in response to a relative's wrongdoing as well as pride for the accomplishments of a relative. More generally, Americans more often express pride for personal accomplishments, whereas Chinese feel pride for achievements that can benefit others. Thus, the development of self-conscious emotions, including children's views on the value of these emotions, must be considered within the larger cultural belief system, particularly the conceptualization of self.

Interim Summary

Taken together, it is apparent that at the same time that their understanding of themselves and their knowledge about the conditions that provoke self-conscious emotions are expanding, young children are also encountering social evaluations of themselves and their actions that contribute to this understanding. Parent—child communications during discipline encounters, achievement situations, and everyday routines interact with the quality of the parent—child relationship and broader cultural values to affect how young children think about themselves and the situations that make them feel good or bad about themselves. Moreover, it appears that when parental practices are both developmentally graded (e.g., helping young children to understand their responsibility for moral violations or achievement successes) and temperamentally sensitive, young children can

acquire the balanced sense of self that enlists self-conscious emotions into responsible conduct and personal success. As this occurs, the association between the developing self and the experience of self-conscious emotions continues to evolve.

SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN MIDDLE TO LATE CHILDHOOD

As children enter grade school and interact with peers in more competitive academic, social, and athletic activities, they more frequently compare their own skills, personality attributes, and characteristics to those of their peers as they become increasingly preoccupied with being accepted, valued, and approved by others outside of the family (Higgins, 1991; Ruble & Frey, 1991). During this time, children's internalization of rules and standards for achievement becomes more solidified, enabling them to better anticipate how other people, including peers and parents, will react to their behavioral choices, as well as how they will evaluate their own performance and moral attributes (Harter, 1998). During middle childhood, children also become more thoughtful interpreters of their parents' behaviors, and, as a result, more frequently evaluate parental reactions in light of their own perceptions of appropriate conduct, the emotional effects of the parent's behavior, and the relevance and consistency of the parental message with what else they know (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994).

These changes in children's social lives and relationships coincide with significant advances in cognition that enable the development of more complex knowledge about the causes of self-conscious emotions. That is, although children begin to personally experience self-conscious emotions early in life, their conceptual knowledge about the determinants of these emotions relies on further development during middle to late childhood. Notably, starting around age 7, children become better able to introspect on their thoughts, they more frequently self-reflect on the contents of their minds, and they become more accurate in judging when other people are thinking and what they are thinking about (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995, 2000). Between the ages of 5 and 10 years children also become more skilled at considering multiple dimensions of a problem at the same time (see Case & Okamoto, 1996; Miller & Aloise, 1989; Piaget, 1952). These cognitive achievements are important because in order to assess self-conscious emotions accurately, the child has to consider both the outcome of the person's behavior (Was it positive or negative?) and the person's control over that behavior (Was it intentional? Was it due to internal vs. external causes?) at the same time (Thompson, 1989; Weiner & Graham, 1985). Indeed, as we will review, during middle childhood children increasingly understand how people's attributions are causally connected to their emotions, and they demonstrate advancing knowledge about the specific causes of pride, shame, and guilt.

Understanding of Pride

One of the first studies to assess children's ability to differentiate pride from happiness was conducted by Thompson (1987). He found that it was not until after 8 years of age that children were able to differentiate between hypothetical situations depicting pride versus happiness. Most difficult for younger children was attention to the characters' role in producing the positive outcome. Thus, for example, young children often predicted that characters felt proud when something good happened even when the character had no personal hand in producing that positive outcome. Graham (1988) also found that

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happiness ars of age ting pride cters' role predicted racter had ound that children younger than 8–10 years of age attributed pride to success (doing well on a test) regardless of whether it was caused by an internal (studying hard) versus external cause (easy test) (see also Kornilaki & Chloverakis, 2004; Weiner & Graham, 1989). Even in children's spontaneous descriptions of pride-eliciting situations, personal control of the positive outcome is rarely mentioned prior to 8 years of age (Harris et al., 1987; Harter & Whitesell, 1989).

Understanding of Guilt and Shame

Children's understanding of guilt and shame has been studied by presenting scenarios that vary on locus of control for behaviors as well as the possibility of outsider evaluation. Although even 4- and 5-year-olds associate both guilt and shame with negative outcomes, only children older than 8 years take into account whether the person was personally responsible for the negative consequence (see Thompson, 1987; Weiner & Graham, 1989). Related studies have shown that 7- to 9-year-olds (and older children) attribute more shame versus guilt to people who are incompetent or inferior to their peers, and more shame versus guilt to people who commit moral transgressions that lead others to think poorly of them (Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Olthof, Schouten, Kuiper, Stegge, & Jennekens-Schinkel, 2000). These findings are consistent with adult conceptions that shame derives from judgments of oneself as a *person*, whereas guilt derives from judgments of one's *behavior* (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

More recently, Olthof et al. (2004) studied young children's knowledge of shame versus guilt in illness-related situations. Results showed that children 7 years and older consistently predicted more shame than guilt in people who did something wrong and it reflected badly on them (e.g., intentionally not taking needed medicine and breaking out in a spotted rash) and more guilt versus shame for situations when people did something wrong and it did not lead to negative evaluation of themselves (e.g., sending a pet rabbit away because the rabbit caused an allergic rash). Interestingly, however, children of all ages predicted high shame reactions in protagonists who suffered a seizure without fault of their own in front of a group of children. Thus, children may not only link shame to behaviors that reflect badly on the self, but also to any kind of personal action that makes other people think one is inferior, bad, or incompetent. In doing so, children demonstrate sophisticated reasoning about the sources of shame, reflective of adult concepts (see Lewis, 2001; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004a).

Self-Conscious Emotions in Rule Situations

Other studies have looked at children's understanding of self-conscious emotions in rule situations. For example, Kornilaki and Chlouverakis (2004) found that between the ages of 7 and 11 children increasingly attribute pride in discretionary moral situations, such as offering one's food to a hungry person, even though one has to make a personal sacrifice. Relatedly, Lagattuta (2005a) found a significant increase between 4 and 7 years of age in children's attributions of negative emotions for transgressors and of positive emotions for rule abiders (see also Arsenio & Lover, 1995). Here, positive affect in compliance situations is closely aligned with pride (being a good person, avoiding harm to self and others, or doing the right thing) and negative affect in transgression situations is reflective of shame and guilt (for being a bad person, violating a standard, or putting oneself or others at risk for harm). Indeed, the developmental shift toward predicting emotions that mis-

match desire fulfillment (i.e., feeling good after inhibiting a desire to abide by a rule) was accompanied by a more frequent focus on norms, obligations, and future consequences in children's explanations for emotions. Interestingly, however, all age groups more frequently predicted positive emotions to rule abiders who exhibited willpower in the absence versus the presence of parental monitoring. Thus, children may develop implicit understanding of the importance of personal control for emotions in rule situations prior to being cognizant of these connections in achievement settings (as with Thompson, 1987).

More recently, Lagattuta (2007) again presented 4- to 7-year-olds with scenarios featuring characters who wanted to do an activity but the behavior conflicted with a prohibitive rule. This time, however, participants were asked to predict the character's behavioral decision as well as the *specific* resulting emotion (happy, proud, surprised, OK, mad, sad, afraid, ashamed). Results showed a developmental shift between 4 and 7 years from consistently predicting that people will do what they *want to* at 4 years to consistently predicting that people will do what they *should do* at 7 years. These age-related changes were reflected in emotion attributions as well: 7-year-olds were also more likely than 4-year-olds to predict that story characters felt positive emotions after compliance despite desire inhibition. Girls predicted self-conscious emotions more frequently than boys (see also Bosacki & Moore, 2004), and there was a trend for attributions of pride and shame to increase with age. Replicating Lagattuta (2005a), young children again showed sensitivity to locus of control in rule situations by more frequently predicting positive emotions, especially pride, when characters chose to abide by a standard in the *absence* of authority figures.

Self-Understanding

As with the preschool years, advances in children's experience of and knowledge about self-conscious emotions during middle childhood are propelled by, as well as reflected in, advances in their understanding of self. During middle childhood, children's self-evaluations and social comparisons become more accurate—resulting in more realistic self-appraisals that acknowledge both strengths and faults (see Ruble & Frey, 1991). Their self-evaluations also become more differentiated, as young people distinguish their strengths and weaknesses in different areas of competence, such as athletic, social, academic, and so forth. Self-esteem also becomes based on how competent children perceive themselves to be in the areas that are *personally important* to them. Thus, it may not engender feelings of shame, for example, to be a poor athlete if athletic prowess is not personally meaningful, but it makes a difference to be a poor trumpet player if the child aspires to play in a jazz band (see Harter, 1999). These assessments of self-worth, as well as personal attributions for success or failure, influence children's experience of self-conscious emotions, their motivation to engage in or avoid certain activities, and their persistence in the face of failure or difficulty (Stipek et al., 1992).

Finally, although even young children appreciate that they do not always behave, look, or perform like others desire them to, these differences between "real" (what you are) versus "ideal" (what you or others want you to be) and "ought selves" (what you or others think you should be like) become more salient during middle childhood (Higgins, 1991; Rogers & Dymond, 1954). The development of these internal guides for what one should be like coincides with middle schoolers' greater need for being approved and accepted by others. This need for approval can have both positive and negative emotional

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behave, hat you t you or liggins, hat one and acnotional consequences. For example, Rudolph, Caldwell, and Conley (2005) report that fourth through eighth graders who cared more strongly about how others evaluated them experienced enhanced self-worth when others liked them and diminished self-worth when others disapproved of them or evaluated them negatively. More generally, children who are more preoccupied with what others think are more easily threatened by others' negative evaluations, and make themselves more vulnerable to more frequent experiences of shame.

Interim Summary

Converging evidence from numerous studies points to 7–8 years of age as a significant transition in children's developing knowledge about the causal determinants of specific self-conscious emotions. Indeed, starting at this age, children become better able to simultaneously consider outcomes, rules, locus of control, and possible future consequences when determining what kind of emotion a person is experiencing. Moreover, they increasingly introspect on their own emotions, evaluations, and beliefs as well as their imaginings about what others may be thinking about them. Such thoughts and introspections coincide with increased differentiation and sophistication in their self-views. Changes in the social environment during middle childhood—most notably, a substantial increase in children's participation in social settings where their skills, characteristics, and behaviors are frequently compared to those of others as well as evaluated by peers and adults outside of the family—propel these cognitive advances.

CONCLUSIONS

Empirical studies on the development of self-conscious emotions have provided revealing insights into how children come to experience, identify, and understand pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment. However, we still have much to learn. We have identified four directions that may be particularly informative for further research.

Improving Methodology to Assess Young Children's Knowledge

Numerous studies report that preschoolers have more limited knowledge about the causes of self-conscious emotions in comparison to children 7 years and older and adults. Some of this difficulty, however, may arise from the methods used to assess young children's knowledge. That is, because self-conscious emotions involve thoughts (about the self, about standards, about locus of control or responsibility), they can be difficult for young children to comprehend due to their more limited knowledge about and attention to thought processes (see Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). Arguably, making story characters' thoughts or attributions more explicit and concrete through the use of pictorial thought bubbles may be effective in eliciting more sophisticated responses in young children. Children as young as 3 readily interpret thought bubbles as pictures in the head (Wellman, Hollander, & Schult, 1996), and even children with autism are significantly aided by the use of thought bubbles in experimental tasks involving people's mental states (Wellman et al., 2002).

Lagattuta (2005b) used thought-bubble methodology to investigate the flexibility of young children's reasoning about emotions in situations where desires conflict with rules.

She told and showed preschoolers (using pictorial thought bubbles) that child protagonists were thinking most about rules (that they did or did not do what they were sunposed to do), potential outcomes (negatives consequences that might happen next or that had been successfully avoided), or desires (whether they did or did not get what they wanted) after deciding to comply with or break a rule. Results showed that 4- and 5-yearolds, just like adults, attributed positive emotions to rule abiders and negative emotions to rule breakers at high rates (Ms > 70% trials) when characters were thinking most about rules or potential outcomes, and predicted significantly lower rates of feel good for willpower and feel bad for transgression when characters were thinking most about desires. Indeed, 4- and 5-year-olds predicted positive emotions for compliance and negative emotions for transgression on the think-rule and think-future trials at more than double the rate of their performance on previous studies using identical (Lagattuta, 2005a) or similar scenarios with no thoughts specified (see Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006 for a review). Thus, the inclusion of specific details about the focus of characters' thoughts may be a useful technique for enabling children to demonstrate more advanced reasoning about emotions.

New methodologies are also needed to tap into even younger children's knowledge about self-conscious emotions, as well as their more general attention to rules and standards. For example, numerous studies have successfully used the social referencing paradigm to assess whether infants will modify their affect or behavior in response to an adult's emotional evaluation of an ambiguous *object*. Reasonably, the social referencing paradigm could be used to assess developmental changes in how infants spontaneously reference others' emotional appraisals of *them* (e.g., skills, behaviors) and use that as a guide to future behavior. That is, are infants more likely to repeat or engage in a prior behavior to which an adult responded positively versus negatively? This could be extended to "observer" situations as well. That is, are infants more likely to imitate the novel actions of a person who is praised (and looks proud) versus a person who is denigrated (and looks ashamed) by an outside observer? Indeed, the social referencing paradigm seems a very promising route for assessing early attention to external evaluations and standards (including violations of these standards), as well as early reasoning about what is "good," "bad," "praiseworthy," and "shameful."

Theory of Mind and Self-Conscious Emotions

Future research should also focus more on connections between theory of mind development and children's experience, identification, and knowledge about self-conscious emotions. Because self-conscious emotions are elicited from a person's thoughts or beliefs about the self and about external standards, as well as ideas about other people's thoughts, beliefs, and emotions, children's knowledge about mental states must contribute to the emergence and understanding of self-conscious emotions. Surprisingly, this has not been a widely studied topic in developmental research. As we have reviewed, there are several pieces of evidence pointing to a significant connection between theory of mind and self-conscious emotion development: young children with greater understanding of mental states demonstrate more sensitivity to criticism, and autistic children impaired in theory of mind knowledge demonstrate low knowledge about causes of self-conscious emotions. Moreover, advances in causal understanding of self-conscious emotions between the ages of 5 and 10 years coincide with significant achievements in children's knowledge about the mind including understanding of intro-

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Attachment and Self-Conscious Emotions

Relationship quality, particularly security of attachment, is strongly connected to how children process information and evaluations about the self. Still, it is unknown whether securely and insecurely attached young children are differentially prone to experiencing guilt, pride, shame, or embarrassment. This is a topic meriting further investigation. A close parent–child relationship can support the growth of pride and self-confidence, for example, but it can also make young children more sensitive to parental criticism or disapproval.

In addition, further study is warranted into the possibility that the security of attachment moderates the influence of other parental practices related to the development of self-conscious emotions. Kochanska, Aksan, Knaack, and Rhines (2004) assessed attachment security at 14 months, parental disciplinary practices at 14–45 months, and conscience development at 56 months. For securely attached children, there was a significant positive longitudinal association between the parent's responsiveness and mild disciplinary procedures and later conscience. For insecurely attached children, there was no such association. Other research groups have also reported that attachment security moderates the influence of parental practices on children's socioemotional development (see Laible & Thompson, 2000; Ontai & Thompson, 2002) and, with respect to self-conscious emotions, this possibility is worth exploring further.

Criteria for Attributing Self-Conscious Emotions to Infants and Toddlers

Finally, it is worth raising the need to develop standard criteria for reliably and validly measuring the experience of self-conscious emotions in preverbal children. That is, when is it valid to identify the gaze aversion of a toddler in response to causing harm to another person, or his or her smile following success on a task, to be indicative of the experience of self-conscious emotions? How do we know it is not simply feeling sad instead of guilty or feeling happy instead of proud, or that the child's behavior reflects an anticipated parental response rather than an internal self-conscious emotion? There are, in short, alternative explanations for these behavioral responses besides that they reflect the experience of self-conscious emotions. Moreover, different studies use different criteria for identifying displays of pride, guilt, shame, and embarrassment. Similar methodological issues plague research with adults (i.e., determining the specific facial and postural behaviors for self-conscious emotions), but at least with adults supplementary measures can be included to verify or confirm the emotional experience, such as self-report (Robins, Noftle, & Tracy, Chapter 24, this volume).

Unfortunately, we do not have a resolution to this problem, aside from the need for researchers to explicitly outline the specific criteria they use to identify displays of self-conscious emotions in very young children so that, at the very least, data can be more easily compared across studies. Promising in this direction is recent research demonstrating that adults (Tracy & Robins, 2004b) as well as children 4 years and older (Tracy et al., 2005) can reliably identify displays of pride (expanded posture, slightly tilted head, small smile) and distinguish it from other positive emotions including happiness. As evidence accumulates for identifiable display markers of self-conscious emotions, researchers will

be better equipped to apply standardized criteria for measuring self-conscious emotion displays in young children.

Final Thoughts

Young children's experience, recognition, and conceptual understanding of self-conscious emotions provide a revealing window into the dynamic interplay between social experiences and cognitive development in early development. That is, self-conscious emotions arise from children's self-perceptions and their awareness and adoption of external standards; however, these cognitive achievements are founded in, and informed by, children's everyday experiences, social relationships, and cultural belief systems. As these social connections continue to change and transform as the child develops (e.g., greater parental pressure for achievement and compliance, increased social comparison and extrafamilial evaluation), children's cognitions about themselves and about the situations that elicit feelings of pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment continue to evolve.

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